A slow but unmistakable shift is taking shape across the Arabian Gulf’s maritime sphere. Navies in Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are working more closely with India—through training programmes, hydrographic assistance, frequent port calls and increasingly open information-sharing. In contrast, their engagement with Pakistan, once a familiar security partner, has steadily narrowed.
What is happening is not a diplomatic flourish. It is a practical recalibration shaped by capability, reliability and the kind of military cooperation these states now require.
Operational Frameworks
Over the last few years, Gulf navies have moved towards more structured, recurring interaction with the Indian Navy.
In October 2024, India’s First Training Squadron sailed into Manama and Dubai on parallel port calls. The engagements were typical of a pattern that has matured quietly—ship visits, cross-deck training, seamanship familiarisation and sustained interaction between sea trainees and Indian Navy instructors. These deployments exposed recruits to practical training at sea while also cementing wider political and maritime links.
Pakistan’s pattern looks very different today. Exercises such as Naseem-Al-Bahr with Oman still take place. Participation in the Combined Maritime Forces continues. But the bilateral training exchanges with Oman, UAE and Kuwait that were once routine have tapered off.
What remains is episodic and limited compared to India’s busy, year-round schedule.
Capacity Building and Expanding Footprint
India has turned naval training into a core pillar of its defence diplomacy in the Gulf.
A clear example came in 2024, when seventy-six cadets from the King Fahad Naval Academy in Saudi Arabia trained at Kochi under the Southern Naval Command. Over four weeks, the group went through simulator modules, basic seamanship drills and time at sea. Saudi naval leadership openly acknowledged how useful it was for young officers to experience life onboard Indian ships.
At any given moment, India trains close to 300 foreign naval personnel at its academies, schools and onboard warships.
The cooperation has deepened on other fronts as well: In 2025, India and Saudi Arabia held their first Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks. Bilateral exercise Al-Mohed Al-Hindi already has two editions behind it, in 2021 and 2023. In August 2025, INS Tamal and Surat berthed in Jeddah, followed by passage exercises and extensive crew interactions.
India and UAE advanced their agenda during the 13th Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting in July 2025, where tailored training courses were formally agreed upon.
The ninth round of Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks between India and UAE broadened maritime information-sharing arrangements.
Pakistan, meanwhile, hosts AMAN every two years, drawing over fifty countries. But that gathering, large as it is, does not replace the regular, deep-dive training that India now offers across Gulf navies. Defence exports tell a similar story. Pakistan’s sales to Gulf buyers are modest. India, on the other hand, has begun supplying a slow but steady stream of indigenous components and systems.
Strategic Calculations
Gulf capitals are not making these choices in the abstract. They see clear differences in capability.
India fields two operational aircraft carriers—INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya. It has a fleet of modern destroyers, frigates and submarines that can sustain long deployments. Through mission-based deployment, the Indian Navy is present almost continuously in the Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. During Operation Sankalp in January 2024, India had more than ten warships operating in the region to protect commercial shipping.
This is tied to a broader doctrine. India’s SAGAR vision, set out in 2015, places cooperative security and maritime stability at the centre of Indian policy. It is not merely aspirational. In April 2025, the Indian Ocean Ship Sagar joined collaborative missions with Indian Ocean island states—an example of how this vision has been operationalised.
Pakistan’s naval profile looks more constrained. Without carriers or large destroyers, the Pakistan Navy’s reach barely extends beyond protection of Karachi and Gwadar. Its ability to contribute to Gulf-wide security tasks—such as anti-piracy patrols, tanker protection or broad surveillance—is limited.
Economic strain has compounded these limitations. Gulf states, previously more generous with financial support, have grown reluctant to bankroll Pakistan’s defence sector. The fallout from Pakistan’s parliamentary decision on Yemen also left a lasting impression in several Gulf capitals.
The steady growth of India–Gulf naval cooperation is rooted in operational need, not just diplomacy. Through training programmes, shared domain awareness, hydrographic support and regular port calls, India has positioned the Indian Navy as a dependable maritime partner for Gulf states.
Pakistan’s limited blue-water capability, episodic engagement and economic constraints have narrowed its relevance to Gulf naval planning. The result is a recalibration that is neither flashy nor confrontational, but unmistakable in its direction.
India’s maritime standing in the Gulf is rising—and doing so on the strength of consistent presence, practical cooperation and a navy capable of meeting the region’s security demands.
